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COMMENTS
DUTIES OF BANKS AS DEPOSITARIES OF TRUST FUNDS
It is the custom of banks to allow a depositor holding trust funds to
deposit those funds in his individual account. This practice is due to
the hesitancy on the part of bank officials to advise the customer to
keep a separate account. The depositor may well draw the inference
that such a course is suggested in order to avoid undesirable irregulari-
ties, and as a result the bank may lose both his fiduciary and individual
deposits.: Where a trustee, or other fiduciary, offers for deposit in his
own name trust funds, known by the bank to be such, mere allowance of
the deposit does not render the bank liable as a participant in a breach
of trust. If the trustee checks out the trust money for the payment
of his individual debts, and the bank does not know the purpose for
which the funds are withdrawn, it does not have to account to the
beneficiary. 2  The bank is under no duty to investigate the propriety
of every withdrawal, and is permitted to assume that the trustee is
acting within the terms of the trust. The reason for this is that such
an investigation would impose too great a burden upon a bank. Where,
however, the bank knowingly participates in or receives a benefit from
an improper withdrawal, it is held liable for the funds so diverted.
Thus if the trustee or other fiduciary draws on the trust funds, or on
his own account containing trust funds,3 in order to pay his personal
indebtedness to the bank, the bank is considered to have knowledge of
the conversion, and becomes liable therefor.4 Of course, when there
is actual knowledge of an improper withdrawal by a trustee, it is the
duty of the bank to prevent it, and its failure to prevent it is not excused
although it would receive no benefit from it.5
'McCollom, Liability of Banks Receiving Checks To a Trustee's Order For
Deposit in His individual Account (igii) ii CoT. L. REV. 428.
2 Santa Marina Co. v. Canadian Bank (ii8, C. C. A. 9th) 254 Fed. 391 (corpor-
ate officer) ; United States, etc., Co. v. First Nat. Bank (1912) 18 Calif. App. 437.
123 Pac. 352 (guardian); Batchelder v. Central Nat. Bank (1905) 188 Mass. 25,
73 N. E. 1O24 (trustee) ; Brookhouse v. Union Publishing Co. (195o) 73 N. H.
368, 62 Atl. 219 (guardian); Gate City B. & L. Ass. v. Bank (1894) 126 Mo. 82,
28 S. W. 633 (corporate officer); State v. Chicago Bonding and Surety Co. (igig,
Mo.) 215 S. W. 20 (receiver) ; Bischoff v. Yorkville Bank (igi6) 218 N. Y. io6,
112 N. E. 759 (executor); Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Bank (igoo) 194 Pa.
334, 44 Atl. 1O64 (administrator); United States Fidelity & G. Co. v. Bank
(1916) 77 W. Va. 665, 88 S. E. lO9 (administrator); contra, Bank v. McPherson
(1912) 102 Miss. 852, 59 So. 934 (public officer) ; United States Fidelity & G.
Co. v. Bank (1913) 127 Tenn. 72o, 157 S. W. 414 (guardian).
' The account must actually contain trust funds before the check is charged
to the account by the bank, and the check must withdraw all the personal deposits,
if any, and some of the trust deposits before the bank is held liable. See Thulin.
Misappropriation By Fiduciary (1918) 6 CAIsF. L. REv. 171, 186.
' United States Fidelity & G. Co. v. Union Bank (1915, C. C. A. 6th) 228 Fed.
448; First Nat. Bank v. Greene (igo8, Ky.) 114 S. W. 322; Allen v. Puritan
Trust Co. (1912) 211 Mass. 409, 97 N. E. 916; Bischoff v. Yorkville Bank, supra
note 2.
'Lowndes v. City Nat. Bank (igog) 82 Conn. 8, 72 Atl. I5o; National Bank v.
Munger (1899) 36 C. C. A. 659, 95 Fed. 87.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
The courts of New York, however, have imposed upon the banks
greater burdens in relation to fiduciary funds than have been imposed
in other jurisdictions. Distinguishing cases of corporate officers from
other classes of fiduciaries, they have imposed upon the banks more
stringent duties in their relation to the former. A bank cannot safely
accept a check payable to a corporation for deposit in the individual
account of the president or other officer, even if it is properly indorsed
by him for the corporation. Although the officer may have the author-
ity to indorse all checks made payable to the corporation, he may not
have the privilege to deposit the proceeds therefrom in his individual
account. The form of the check is considered as notice to the bank that
it is the property of the corporation and the bank must, at its peril,
inquire concerning the authority of the officer to deposit in his personal
account. If the bank fails to do so it becomes liable if the officer draws
out the proceeds of the check for personal purposes."
The New York Court of Appeals has departed from the general
rule even where the fiduciary is not a corporate officer. In Bischoff v.
Yorkville BankT an executor withdrew trust funds, known to the bank
to be such, and deposited them in his general account in order to pay
his personal debts, one of which was an indebtedness to the bank.
The court in that case said that "a fiduciary may legally deposit the
trust funds in a bank to his individual account and credit. Knowledge
on the part of the bank of the nature of the funds received and credited
does not affect the character of the act. The bank has the right to
presume that the fiduciary will apply the funds to their proper purposes
under the trust."" "A bank does not become privy to a misappropria-
tion by merely paying or honoring checks of a depositor drawn upon
his individual account in -which there are, in the knowledge of the bank,
credits created by deposits of trust funds." 9 But where the fiduciary
drew on the trust funds to pay a personal indebtedness to the bank the
bank had actual notice that the fiduciary was misapplying those trust
funds. Furthermore, it could no longer presume that the executor was
properly applying the funds, and was under a duty to inquire as to the
purpose of all subsequent withdrawals. By failing to make such
inquiry the bank became liable not only for the amount which it had
itself received, but also for all money thereafter converted by the
trustee. The holding in the Bischoff case that the bank was not liable
for the amounts withdrawn by the executor before the payment of his
' Wagner Trading Co. v. Battery Park Nat. Bank (1920) 228 N. Y. 37, 126
N. E. 347. Where an officer of a corporation authorized to sign checks therefor
wrongfully drew checks to his own order and deposited it in his individual
account, see Havana C. Ry. v. Knickerbocker T. Co. (igio) 198 N. Y. 422, 92
N. E. 12 (that depositary bank is not liable) ; Havana Central Ry. v. Central
Trust Co. (1913) 123 C. C. A. 72, 2o4 Fed. 546 (that drawee bank is not liable).
"Supra note 2.
8218 N. Y. at p. 111, 112 N. E. at p. 76o.
S218 N. Y. at p. 112, 112 N. E. at p. 761.
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indebtedness to the bank is, as shown above, in accord with the great
weight of authority. The holding that the bank was liable for the
amounts paid to it in discharging the executor's individual indebtedness
to it, is likewise generally accepted. But the case, so far as it held the
bank liable for the amounts withdrawn by the executor after the pay-
ment of his indebtedness to the bank, and not used in paying the bank,
went much further than any prior decision.10
The recent case of Whiting v. Hudson Trust Company (1922) 2o2
App. Div. 375, 195 N. Y. Supp. 829, the court being divided, shows
a tendency to hold banks liable for all conversions of trustees or other
fiduciaries who deposit trust funds in their individual accounts. In
that case one Eckerson having an individual account in the defendant
bank informed the bank that for purposes of bookkeeping he desired
to open another separate individual account. The bank suggested that
it be designated as Number 2 or "Special," and it was decided that it
should be called "special" account. In this account Eckerson deposited
five checks belonging to a trust fund, one payable to him as "trustee"
and four as "executor." Eckerson converted the proceeds of these
checks, and the bank was held liable.
The foll6wing quotations show the basis of the court's decision:
* . . the check was made to the order of Eckerson as 'trustee' a
circumstance which in itself would have attracted the special attention
of any prudent bank official that it involved a fiduciary relationship
. . . .""I "With respect to these 'executor' checks the defendant trust
company had notice upon the face of the checks that they did not belong
to Eckerson individually and they were charged with the duty of inquir-
ing as to Eckerson's relationship to these checks."' 2 "The rule out-
lined in Bischoff v. Yorkville Bank related to a general account of a
depositor and not to a special account as that before us."" It is sub-
mitted that this language cannot be reconciled with the Bischoff case.'4
The statement that the checks payable to Eckerson as executor charged
the bank with the duty of inquiring as to Eckerson's relationship to
these checks is diametrically opposed to the holding in the Bischoff case.
The fact that the funds were kept in a "special" account does not seem
to be sufficient basis for a distinction.
30 For discussions of Bischoff v. Yorkville Bank, supra note 2, see Scott Parti-
cipation In a Breach of Trust (1921) 34 HARV. L. REv. 454, 477; (1916) 4 VA.
L. REv. 153; (1916) I6 Cot. L. REV. 341.
' (1922) 202 App. Div. 375 at p. 379, 195 N. Y. Supp. 829 at p. 832.
2Ibid at p. 383, at p. 835.
13 Supra note 12.
"The recent case of Wagner Trading Co. v. Battery Park National Bank,
supra note 5, held the bank liable for the conversion by a corporate officer where
the bank allowed the officer to deposit checks payable to the corporation and
properly indorsed by him in his individual account. In view of the Wagner
case the principal case was not wholly unexpected by the banking world. See
(1920) 37 BANKING L. JOuR. 505.
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It is important to note that since the occurrence of the facts in the
principal case a statute 5 has been enacted in New York which makes
guilty of a misdemeanor every executor, administrator, guardian, or
testamentary trustee who deposits in his own name funds received from
the estate of any deceased person. It seems that by force of this statute a
bank which has knowledge will be held liable for all funds so deposited
and converted by these fiduciaries, thereby furnishing a salutary check
upon undesirable irregularities. If such fiduciaries are permitted by
the banks to deposit trust funds only in an account labeled as a fiduciary
one, the fiduciary will find it more difficult to pay his indi-idual debts
from the trust funds. A check will have to be signed in his fiduciary
capacity and will be a warning on its face to all who accept it that they
are accepting trust funds and that they will be liable to the beneficiary
of the trust for its conversion by the trustee.' 6 The beneficiary has not
this protection where the trustee is allowed to deposit funds in his
individual account.
DOES BREACH OF CONTRACT DESTROY DUTY TO PERFORM?
Has one who has contracted to sell certain specific chattels to another
the "right," after having refused to keep the contract, to sell the chattels
to someone else? A majority of the court so held in Hong Hoon v.
Lum Wai (1922) 26 Haw. 541, a case in which the chattels were of
such a character that specific performance would not be decreed.' One
member of the court dissented, asserting that the seller had the power,
but not the right, to make such a sale. The essential facts were briefly
these: The plaintiffs contracted to sell to the defendants, and the
defendants agreed to buy, all the "marketable taro" that might be grown
by the sellers on certain lands, for the period of two years. After a
few months the sellers broke the contract and refused to make further
delivery. The buyers brought a suit for specific performance and
obtained incidentally a temporary injuction restraining the sellers
from delivering the taro to anyone other than the buyers.2 The buyers
N. Y. Laws, ii6, ch. 558, sec. 2664a; N. Y. Surro. Ct. Laws, 1920, ch. 928,
par. 231. The American Bar Association has approved a Uniform Fiduciaries
Act. "The object of the Act is to relieve persons dealing with a fiduciary from
the heavy responsibility of a constructive inquiry into the good faith of the
fiduciary. In practice such inquiries are impossible in the ordinary course of
banking and commercial transactions; and there is involved a risk which should
be eliminated, except in cases of knowledge of fraud or personal advantage to
the payee or recipient. (1922) 8 A. B. A. JouR. 641.
16 Scott, op. cit. 459-463.
'Accord, New England Box Co. v. Prentiss (1912) 76 N. H. 313, 82 At. 531.
'In the case the additional fact appeared that the buyers had assigned the
contract, and the actual suit was by the assignees. This, however, did not alter
the substance of the situation.
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gave the usual injunction bond to indemnify the sellers for all damage
which the latter might suffer "by reason of the issuance of the temporary
injunction in the event that it shall be finally determined that the same
was improvidently or wrongfully issued." Later a demurrer going to
the merits of the bill was sustained and the injunction dissolved, on the
ground that the remedy at law was adequate. The sellers had in the
meantime, because of the coercion of the injunction, delivered the taro
to the buyers at the equivalent of the contract price. The sellers now
sued the buyers on the injunction bond, claiming to recover the differ-
ence between the contract price and the price which, but for the injunc-
tion, they could have obtained in the market. As indicated above, this
contention of the sellers was approved by a majority of the court. It
is believed that a somewhat more careful analysis than that used by
either the majority or minority of the court will serve to state the
problem of the case more clearly and thus open the way to a satisfactory
solution.
Given a contract for the sale of chattels of such a character that
specific performance may not be had, what is the legal situation: (i)
before breach and refusal of further performance by the seller; (2)
after such breach? Before breach, clearly a right-duty relation exists
between the two parties. If the seller refuses to perform this duty, the
common law will not attempt to make him do so; it will confine its
activities to giving damages. Equity will keep its hands off. Clearly
the breach by the seller has altered the legal situation; a new right-duty
relation, requiring the payment of damages, has come into existence.
Such a legal relation may be called secondary or remedial as distin-
guished from primary or antecedent.3 Does the primary right-duty
relation also continue to exist? To some extent courts and legal writers
seem to think that it does. Witness the rule followed by most courts
that doing or promising again to do the thing required by the original
right-duty relation is not a good consideration to support a promise,
the argument being that there is already in existence a duty to do the
act or acts in question, even after breach. There seems, however, to
be no direct sanction for this supposed "duty"--it cannot be "broken"
so as to give rise to another and different secondary or remedial right,
either to damages or specific performance. Moreover, it would seem
The distinction between primary and secondary rights is, like all other classi-
fications of rights, one of convenience. When one owns a chattel, for example,
we say that he has a right, or, better, rights, that other persons refrain from
dealing with it except in certain authorized ways; these are primary or antece-
dent rights. When someone violates one of these rights, a new right-duty
relation requiring the payment of damages arises. This is for convenience
called a secondary or remedial relation, as it is given in order to vindicate or
sanction the primary right. Cf. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions (1923)
151, note 32.
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that the existence of the misnamed "duty to mitigate damages" 4 on the
part of the buyer in such a case as we are considering, is inconsistent
with the exception that the duty to deliver still exists. If the latter
were the true view, it would seem that the buyer ought to be allowed to
treat the contract as a going concern, so to speak, without being under
the necessity to take steps to mitigate the damages. If, therefore, the
duty to deliver is conceived of as still existing, the concept of duty is
necessarily widened to include a legal relation of exceedingly imperfect
sanction, for the only sanction is the one involved in the rule about
consideration previously referred to.5 Moreover, is not the refusal to
decree specific performance based on the idea that where damages are
adequate, the person bound by the contractual duty ought to be left free
to pay damages in lieu of performing? 5
' There is obviously no duty in any accurate sense of the term, to mitigate
damages; that is, the one under the so-called duty does not commit a legal
wrong by failing to do so. Cf. Burch, J., in Rock v. gandine (192o) io6 Kan.
588, 189 Pac. 157. The opinion in that case is interesting for the reason that it
incorporates for the first time into a judicial opinion the Hohfeld table of jural
relations. In cases involving so-called anticipatory breach the situation between
the time of the breach and the time when it becomes necessary for the other
party to incur expense if he is to treat the contract as a going concern, involves
nice points of analysis with which it is beyond the scope of the present comment
to deal.
'It may well be that an adequate analytical jurisprudence will compel the
recognition and careful discussion of what may be called "imperfect" legal
relations. For example, the statement that a wife is under a duty to nurse her
husband when ill and that therefore doing so, or promising to do so, is not a
sufficient consideration to support a promise, would probably not be dissented
from by most lawyers. The duty in such a case, if it be called a duty, lacks
the ordinary sanctions-no action by the husband against the wife, for damages
or specific. performance, will lie. Nevertheless, there is what it is at least possi-
ble to regard as a kind of indirect sanction, and our fundamental legal concepts
must be so formed as to take into account such situations. It is, however, not
intended to do more here than to suggest the nature of the problem, without
attempting a solution.
The rule about consideration mentioned in the text may be unheld without
taking the view that a "duty" to perform still exists after breach. It would
seem sound policy not to permit a promisor ordinarily to obtain additional
reward by refusing to keep a contractual obligation. If this be, as the present
writer believes, the only real justification for the rule, it is possible to approve
of cases (such as King v. Duluth M. & N. Ry. (1895) 61 Minn. 482, 63 N. W.
11o5) which hold that if one does, or prnmises to do, acts which he is already
under a duty to do (in the imperfect sense above described), there is sufficient
consideration if there turns out to be some unforeseen difficulty or hardship in
the first contract, provided one reaches the conclusion that such a result is
consistent with sound economic and business policy.
' This does not mean that prior to breach there is no legal duty to perform,
but merely that the only coercion which will be brought to bear in order to
indude performance of the duty is the threat of being required to pay damages.
When that threat proves insufficient to prevent the breach, as in the instant case,
the view in the text simply is that the law puts an end to the duty to perform and
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We may express this view of the situation by saying that the seller
has, before breach, the legal power by breaking the contract and refus-
ing further performance, so to alter the legal relations of the parties
that the original or primary right-duty relation requiring delivery of
the goods as promised, is brought to an end, and there is substituted
therefor a secondary or remedial right-duty relation requiring the pay-
ment of damages only. If this analysis, which is merely an attempt to
state clearly the results reached by the courts, is sound, it seems that
after breach the seller in the case at hand has the legal privilege7 to
sell the goods where he pleases. He is the complete owner of them,
both at law and in equity, and there is no longer even a contractual
duty to the buyer to deliver them to him. True, the seller must pay
the damages caused by the wrongful exercise of his legal power to
put an end to his contractual duty to deliver; but that is all. The
seller is legally free, on the other hand, to protect himself from loss by
selling in the open market if he wishes.
In the principal case, it turned out, the temporary injunction was
erroneously issued, that is, while binding until reversed, the granting
of it was contrary to the rules governing the exercise of equitable juris-
diction in specific performance cases in the particular jurisdiction; and
it prevented the plaintiff (defendant in the specific performance suit)
from exercising his legal "right," that is, his privilege, to sell to whom
he pleased. He should not have been so prevented, but should have
been left free to sell where he pleased, paying whatever damages might
be inflicted on the buyer by his breach of contract. It is to indemnify
against just such erroneous prevention of the exercise of legal privileges
that injunction bonds are required. Plaintiffs who in perfect good faith
obtain temporary injunctions are required to run just such risks.8
Fundamentally, of course, such a rule, like any other rule of law, must
substitutes merely a duty to pay the damages caused by the breach. Holmes'
well-known statement in The Commono Law (i88i) 301, to the effect that a
person is free to break a contract, is often misinterpreted. It does not deny
the existence of a legal duty to keep a contract, but merely asserts that the law
leaves a person free from physical coercion. Thus interpreted, the statement
seems true enough, but is open to the objection that it is likely to be misleading.
"Free" does not mean legally free, that is, legally privileged. It would seem
that in Holmes' sense a man is equally "free" to commit torts, except in cases
where physical coercion (injunction, etc.) will be used to prevent him from so
acting. It may be doubted whether this is the best way to put the matter.
"Privilege" means here "permissive right" or "liberty," that is, that the one
having the legal privilege is under no duty to refrain from doing the act or acts
in question. Hohfeld, op. cit. stpra note 3, 38.
8 For example, in case of a bona fide dispute over ownership of land, a plaintiff
obtaining a temporary injunction restraining, for example, the mining of ore,
must give an injunction bond under which, if it turns out that the defendant
owns the land and so was restrained from exercising his privileges of ownership,
the plaintiff will have to pay to the defendant the damages caused by such
deprivation of privilege.
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be defended upon grounds of policy. In the principal case, it seems
difficult to disagree with the majority without making up our minds
that the primary duty to keep the promise to deliver ought to be regarded
as still alive after breach and repudiation. If so, it would seem that
we ought, if we are to be reasonably consistent, to give to such duty
some greater sanction than the imperfect one discussed above. Inas-
much as we do not do that, the view that the primary duty comes to an
end with the breach and that there takes its place a duty to pay damages,
appears on the whole more consistent and harmonious with the rule deny-
ing specific performance in cases like the one before the court. It
need hardly be added that the case is quite otherwise when specific
performance may be had. Perhaps the present writer ought also to
say that he sees no reason why it would not be good policy to decree
specific performance in many cases in which we now say-not very
truthfully, if we look economic facts in the face-that the remedy at
law by way of damages is adequate; and that this is especially true of
all such contracts as that involved in the principal case.
Before dismissing the case it should be noted that the majority of
the court recognized that the buyer was entitled to recover from the
seller damages for the breach of contract, and that the amount of these
damages might equal that recovered by the seller in the instant case.
It was, however, held that under the procedure in the particular jurisdic-
tion the damages for breach of contract could not be recouped in this
action by the seller on the injunction bond, on the ground that the claim
sought to be recouped "must arise out of the same transaction or subject
matter as the demand sued for." In many jurisdictions it could, of
course, be enforced by way of set-off or counterclaim.
W. W. C.
JOINDER OF ACTIONS AND OF PARTIES
At common law as well as under the original codes of procedure the
subjects of joinder of causes of action and joinder of parties were con-
sidered as entirely separate and distinct matters, controlled by entirely
dissimilar rules. In practice, however, they often overlap and the rules
as to each become concurrent restrictions when applied to a particular
case. Thus, while a suit between a single plaintiff and a single defen-
dant may raise the subject of joinder of causes alone, a suit where on
either side there is more than one party may raise both questions unless
the parties are united in interest. The failure of the drafters of codes
to appreciate the effect of this interrelation of the subjects has led to
much difficulty and confusion in the cases.
Several tests were ordinarily used at common law to determine the
question of joinder: the use of the same process; the form of the
action; identity of pleas; identity of judgments.' The "dead hand
of the common law" rules us from its grave, for even with the intro-
'Sunderland, Joinder of Actions (1920) 18 MICEH. L. REv. 571, 573-578.
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duction of code pleading, the legislatures were unable to free themselves
from the common-law precedents which called for a formal test of some
kind. Hence we have in most of our codes a fixed classification based
upon similarity in subject matter, joinder being permitted only of those
causes of action falling within the named subdivisions.2 The theory
of this classification is hard to justify.3 Thus, why should all contract
actions be joinable while tort actions are joinable only under certain
circumstances, and this under a code abolishing forms of actions? If
by such provisions the legislatures were attempting to formulate rules of
convenience of trial, they were obviously undertaking a difficult task,
for it is nearly impossible to foretell just what combinations will be
convenient. Realizing this difficulty, a few states have rejected the
theory that a priori restrictions are helpful, and now allow, in the discre-
tion of the trial court, practically an unlimited freedom of joinder.4
The rule governing the joinder of plaintiffs in a common-law action
turned on the distinction between joint and several interests. If the
defendant was legally answerable to two or more jointly, all of them
would have to join as plaintiffs in the action unless a valid excuse for
non-joinder appeared on the face of the pleading.' If the interests
were several there could be no joinder even where the rights of all the
plaintiffs had been violated by one and the same wrongful act.6 The
equity rule seems rather to have considered what was convenient under
the particular circumstances, the matter being within the discretion of
the trial court.7  Most of the codes, although combining legal and
equitable procedure and adopting the equitable rules permitting joinder
of parties, strangely enough reflected the influence of the common-law
rules rather than those of equity. Thus as to plaintiffs, only those
having an interest in the subject of the action and in obtaining the relief
demanded could join, while to be joined as a defendant one must have
or claim an interest in the controversy adverse to the plaintiff, or must
be a party necessary for the complete determination or settlement of the
question involved therein.8 The subject was tied up with that of
joinder of actions by the requirement that all actions united in the same
complaint "must affect all parties to the action."9  Under the latter
provision, different persons having separate causes of action, although
arising from the same transaction, could not unite in bringing suit.10
Statutes are collected in Sunderland, Cases on Code Pleading (1913) 192.
' Sunderland, sitpra note i, at p. 579.
'Kan. Gen. Sts. 1915, sec. 6979; Iowa Code, 1897, sec. 3545; Mich. Comp.
Laws, 1915, sec. 12309; N. J. Prac. Act. 1912, secs. 6, 11, and rule 21.
'Sweigart v. Berk (1822, Pa. Sup. Ct) 8 Serg. & P- 3o8; 30 Cyc. io6.
'Pomeroy, Code Remedies (4th ed. 1904) 215.
'Story, Equity Pleading (8th ed. 187o) secs. 284, 530.
'Sunderland, supra note 2, at p. 79, containing a collection of statutes.
'Sunderland, supra note 2.
"0Midland Terra Cotta Co. v. Illinois Co. (1916) 163 Wis. i9o, 157 N. W. 785;
Gardner v. Rwmsey (1921) 81 Okla. 20, 196 Pac. 941; Ryder et ux. v. Jefferson
Hotel Co. (1922, S. C.) 113 S. E. 474.
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In England, the criterion of convenience rather than that of the inter-
est involved has been adopted. "All persons may be joined in one action
as plaintiffs, in whom any right to relief [in respect of or arising out of
the same transaction or series of transactions] is alleged to exist,
whether jointly, severally, or in the alternative, [where if such persons
brought sepaTate actions any common question of law or fact would
arise; provided that, if upon the application of any defendant it shall
appear that such joinder may embarrass or delay the trial of the action,
the Court or a Judge may order separate trials, or make such other
order as may be expedient], and judgment may be given for such one
or more of the plaintiffs as may be found entitled to relief. . .. "I"
Substantially the same provision is to be found in the present New York
Civil Practice Act.12  Such provisions have the beneficial effect of
permitting persons injured in a single accident or by any other single
tortious act of another person or persons to sue together, thus avoidng
multiplicity of actions with resulting delay and expense.13
As long as the action is against one defendant only or against several
defendants sought to be made liable jointly, there is little difficulty in
applying this rule. A different question arises where two or more
defendants are sued each on a several liability. Prior to the amendment
of Order 16, Rule i, the House of Lords had decided that Order 16
related only to the joinder of parties in respect to the same cause of
action.: 4 Consequently the amendment was passed giving it the form
indicated above, but no change was made in Order 16, Rule .4,15 which
governed the joinder of defendants.16 Despite the conflicting decisions
rendered under Order 16 in its amended form,17 it seems from a series
of recent cases which have come before the English Court of Appeal
and in which the entire Order has been construed liberally that the
present English scheme of practice permits the joinder of plaintiffs or
defendants on practically the same terms, namely, where claims arise
out of the same transaction or series of transactions and there is a
' Rules of the Supreme Court, 1883, Order i6, Rule i. Words within the
brackets added by amendment of October 26, 1896.
' Civil Practice Act, N. Y. Laws, i92o, ch. 925, sec. 209.
" White, King, and Stringer, The Annual Practice (1922) 95; Medina, Some
Phauses of the New York Civil Practice Act and Rides (1921) 21 Coi.. L. REv. 113,
121.
1 4 Sinurthwaite v. Hannay [1894, H. L.J A. C. 494. Where there were separate
causes of action joinder of several plaintiffs was disallowed.
""All persons may be joined as defendants against whom the right to any relief
is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally, or in the alternative. And judgment
may be given against such one or more of the defendants as may be found to be
liable, according to their respective liabilities, without any amendment"
16 Prior to the alteration of Order i6, Rule i, the House of Lords held that
claims for damages against two or more defendants in respect of their several
liability for separate torts could not be combined in one action by reason of
Order I6, Rule 4. Sadler v. Great Western Ry. [i896, H. L.] A. C. 450.
' White, King, and Stringer, op. cit. 223.
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common question of law or fact; subject to the discretion of the court,
however, to sever the actions or adopt such other remedial means as
will prevent embarrassment or prejudice.'
The provisions in the present New York Civil Practice Act regarding
joinder of plaintiffs and joinder of defendants are practically the same
as those which- exist in England.19 Hence it was to be expected that
the New York courts would be confronted with the same difficulties that
faced the English courts after the amendment of Order 16 in 1896.
The problem was squarely presented in the recent case of S. L. & Co. v.
Bock (1922, Sup. Ct.) 1I8 Misc. 756, 194 N. Y. Supp. 773.20 The
action was brought to recover the reasonable rental value of certain
apartments in New York City. Seven individuals were named as
defendants. The complaint alleged that all of the defendants were
tenants in the same house, each occupying a separate apartment. The
plaintiff demanded a separate judgment against each defendait for the
reasonable rental value of the apartment occupied by him. The defen-
dants moved for an order dismissing the complaint on the ground of
misjoinder. The court, following the interpretation of Order 16 as
given by the recent English cases, allowed the joinder, the claims having
arisen out of the same set of circumstances and involving a common
question of fact. Such a liberal construction of the new Act is to be
commended.
In adopting the present New York Civil Practice Act the legisla-
ture apparently failed to appreciate the intimate connection between
joinder of parties and joinder of causes of action, for although it
adopted the English rule as to the former, it failed to do so with respect
to the latter. In England, with the exception of actions for the recovery
of land 2 1 and actions by a trustee in bankruptcy, 22 the plaintiff may,
without leave but subject to the discretion of the court,23 join all his
causes of action whatever they may be. Although the Board of
Statutory Consolidation in its report of 191524 recommended the adop-
tion of the English precedent, the recommendation was not followed.
Instead, the New York Civil Practice Act limits the joinder of actions
by permitting it in only the, twelve specified classes of the previous
code. 25 Why New" York should have chosen twelve classes and other
states varying numbe'rs-usually from three to seven-is not easily
explained. While it is no longer necessary under the Civil Practice
Oesterrechische Export A. G. v. BritWish Indemnity Ins. Co. [1914, C. A.]
2 K. B. 747; Thomas v. Moore [1918, C. A.] I K. B. 555; Payne v. British Time
Recorder Co. [1921, C. A.) 2 K. B. i.
"Civil Practice Act, mpra note 12, sees. 209, 211.
"See (1922) 7, U. of PA. L. REv. 87.
" Rules of the Supreme Court, 1883, Order i8, Rule 2.
"Ibid. Rule 3.
' Ibid. Rules I, 8, 9.
"Report of Board of Statutory Consolidation on Simplification of Civil Practice
(1915, N. Y.) Rule 181.
' Civil Practice Act, supra note 12, sec. 258.
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Act that all the causes of action joined in the same complaint affect all
the parties,2 6 this definite limitation is still placed upon the character
of the causes of action that may be joined. This was brought out
clearly in another recent New York case 7 in which the court held that
a count for injuries to premises could not be joined with a count for
reasonable rental value.
The conclusion concerning the entire subject of joinder ought to be
that it, like all procedural subjects, should be relegated to it s appropriate
subordinate position of being not an end in itself but merely a means to
an end-the doing of substantial justice to the parties litigant according
to rules of substantive law. Hence the test would be how those rules of
substantive law may be most conveniently and expeditiously applied to
the matters in issue between the parties. Where claims by or against
different parties arise out of the same transaction or series of transac-
tions and involve a common question of law or fact-thus rendering
it desirable that the whole of the matter should be disposed of at the
same time-it should be within the discretion of the court to allow the
joinder of plaintiffs or defendants. Nor is there any necessity for'
adhering to such artificial restrictions in regard to joinder of causes of
action as are found in most of the code states. In this field also there
should be allowed in the discretion of the trial court a maximum of
freedom of joinder, convenience and expedition of trial being the
guiding principles.
THE MINIMUM WAGE AND LIBERTY OF CONTRACT
By an Act of Congress a Minimum Wage Board for the District of
Columbia was established, with power, after investigation, to fix mini-
mum wages to be paid to women and minors in any occupation. Act
of Sept. 19, 1918 (40 Stat. at L. 960). A failure to observe the wages
set by the Board would involve punishment by fine and imprisonment.
Two bills were brought to enjoin the enforcement of the Act by an
employer and an employee respectively. The Court held the law
unconstitutional as an unlawful interference with freedom of contract.
Children's Hospital v. Minimum Wage Board: Lyons v. Same (1922,
D. C.) 50 WASH. L. REP. 721.
This question is still an open one due to the fact that in the Oregon
Minimum Wage Cases, which have been the only test cases before the
United States Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Brandeis had been of counsel
and hence was disqualified. The constitutionality was upheld by a
divided court, without opinion, the vote being four to four., Besides
the District of Columbia, thirteen states and territories now have mini-
2'S. L. & Co. v. Bock (1922, Sup. Ct) 118 Misc, at p. 761, 194 N. Y. Supp. at
P. 777.
1x37 East 66th Street, Ine. v. Lawrence (1922, Sup. Ct.) 18 Misc. 486, 194
N. Y. Supp. 762.
'Stettler v. O'Hara: Simpson v. Same (1917) 243 U. S. 629, 37 Sup. Ct. 475.
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mum wage laws, Texas having repealed her statute.2  Although such
a statute was repealed in Nebraska,8 a constitutional amendment was
passed later permitting such laws for women and children.4 A con-
stitutional amendment in Ohio sanctions such laws for all employees.,
The statute in the District of Columbia is typical of those in force in
eight states.6  Three of these states have held them constitutional 7
and five have not yet passed upon them.8 The District of Columbia
alone has acted unfavorably. Two states and one territory have laws
applicable to women only.9 In Arizona, Porto Rico, and Utah'10 the rate
is fixed directly by the legislature, but the constitutionality of these
statutes has not yet been called in question. A Massachusetts statute
has been held valid which provides for enforcement by "black-listing"
in newspapers. 1
No constitution fathers particular economic policies; thus the policy
of laisses faire does not inhere in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments.12  But this is not equivalent to affirming that the police power
is the legitimate means of overturning the existing economic order.
The American Constitution postulates a social order; the Bill of Rights
is founded on "natural" law, or those fundamental human rights which
have been regarded during the development of the common law as the
basis of society.'3 This conception of a social order is vague in its
outlines, it is true, and shifting and varying to some degree in its
2 Tex. Complete Sts. 1920, tit. 77, ch. ia, repealed by Gen. Laws, 1921, ch. 118.
'Neb. Sess. Laws, 1913, ch. 211, repealed by Sess. Laws, 1919, ch. i9o.
Neb. Const. art. XV, sec. 8.
Ohio Const. art II, sec. 34.
' These provide for administrative determination of rates, are applicable to
both women and children, and penalize violations by fine and imprisonment.
"Or. Laws, 1920, tit. 38, ch. 2; Stettler v. O'Hara (1914) 69 Or. 519, 139 Pac.
173; Simpson v. O'Hara (1914) 70 Or. 261, II Pac. 158; Minn. Gen. Sts. 1913,
ch. 23, secs. 3904-3923, amended by Minn. Sess. Laws, 1921, ch. 84; Williams .v.
Evans (917) 139 Minn. 32, 165 N. W. 495; Wash. Sess. Laws, 1913, ch. 174,
amended by ibid. 1915, ch. 68, and 1917, ch. 29; Larsen v. Rice (1918) ioo Wash.
642, 171 Pac. IO37.
8 Deering's Calif. Gen. Laws, 1915, Act 16o8, amended by ibid. Acts 1917-1919,
and Calif. Sts. 1921, ch. 279; Colo. Sess. Laws, 1913, ch. iio, amended by ibid.
1917, ch. 98; Kan. Gen. Sts. 1915, ch. io8, art. 42, amended by Kan. Sess. Laws,
1921, ch. 263; N. D. Sess. Laws, 1919, ch. 174; Wis. Sts. 1921, ch. 83, sec. 1729s.
'Ariz. Sess. Laws, 1917, ch. 38; Crawf. & Moses Ark. Sts. 1921, ch. 117,
secs. 71o8-7111, amended by Acts, 1921, Act 140; Porto Rico Sess. Laws, 1919,
Act 45. The Arkansas law has been declared constitutional. State v. Crow
(1917) 13o Ark. 272, 197 S. W. 4.
10 Utah Comp. Laws, 1917, ch. 4, secs. 3671-3674.
Mass. Gen. Laws, 1921, ch. 151; Holcombe v. Creamer (1918) 231 Mass. 99,
12o N. E. 354.
See the dissenting opinion of Holmes, J., in Lochner v. New York (1905)
198 U. S. 45, 25 Sup. Ct. 539; Pound, Liberty of Contract (19o8) 18 YALE LAW
JoURNAL, 454.
Kales, "Due Process:" the Inarticulate Major Premise and the Adamson Act
(1917) 26 YAt LA.w JOURNAL, 519.
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arrangement and substance, but withal reasonably tangible in that it
is distinguishable in essentials from socialistic and communistic types.
Without some such conception, a constitution is a mere body of maxims
of political morality.'4  It has been termed by Professor Kales the
"inarticulate major premise" in due process cases. While the court
prefers not to tie itself down by proclaiming it, it lies consciously or
unconsciously behind its decisions. Our economic system is industrial,
competitive, constructed upon a basis of private property privately
managed. To strike unduly at this is unconstitutional.
But whatever view of fundamentals we may take, it is impossible
not to recognize that in many cases incapacity to deal freely with
economic or other advantage has been recognized as necessary to the
safety of the social order. A lender is under a disability to buy freely
from his debtor an equity of redemption in a mortgage which the latter
may desire to sell.- The sailor has ever been the ward of the admiralty
court."'6 Usury laws have restricted the returns on capital.", There
is no freedom to drive hard bargains with heirs for their expectancies.'
8
And in general when knowledge and experience are all on one side the
advantage may not be unduly pressed.' 9  The Lochiser case,2 0 to which
the instant case reverts, has been thoroughly discredited.
2 '
Thus, even granting the Minimum Wage Law to be a restraining
of an advantage purely economic (and it is not, for physical disabili-
ties-which no social system cn alter-are directly concerned), it is
backed by unquestionable analogy in precedent. Moreover, does it not
seem impossible to deny that the refusal of a privilege to pay starvation
wages to women and children is reasonably calculated to increase the
security of the social order, rather than diminish it?
VALUATION IN RATE-MAKING
Although the fixing of rates is primarily a legislative function, the
courts are confronted with this problem when they are called upon to
determine the reasonableness of those rates." It is not sufficient for
them to say that a fair or reasonable rate is a fair return on a fair value,
"J. B. Thayer, Legal Essays (igo) 2.
Peugh v. Davis (1877) 96 U. S. 332.
COMMENTS (1923) 32 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 280.
Coast Finance Corp. v. Powers Furniture Co. (1922, Or.)2og Pac. 614;
(1923) 32 YALE LAWJORNAL, 412.
Spears v. Spaw (19o9, Ky.) 118 S. W. 275; 25 L. P,. A. (N. s.)436, note.
'" In further analogous situations the Supreme Court has upheld governmental
regulation. Knoxville Iron Co. v. Harbison (ioi) 183 U. S. 13, 22 Sup. Ct. I
(mode of wage payment prescribed); N. Y. Laws, 192o, ch. 944 (legislation
fixing rents) ; see Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman (ig2i) 256 U. S. 170, 41 Sup.
Ct. 465.
:' Supra note 12.
Bunting v. Oregon (917) 243 U. S. 426, 37 Sup. Ct. 435.
'The ancient common-law rule permitted public utilities to fix their own charges
with the qualification that they must confine themselves to taking only reasonable
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because, strictly speaking, rate determines value. 2  Several theories
have been developed for determining the valuation on which rates are to
be based. The first, that based on capitalization, has not met with
approval,8 because, if the par value of the bonds and stock be taken as
the criterion, the rates will often yield a return on much watered stock;
on the other hand, if the market value of the securities is used, the
"vicious circle" will again be in operation. Another is the value of the
service rendered the public. This test by itself is clearly unworkable
because of uncertainty.4
The leading case, Smyth v. Ames,5 lays down the present fair-value
rates. Allnut v. Inglis (18io) 12 East, 527; Munn v. Illinois (1876) 94 U. S.
113. Today the "due process clause" of the Fourteenth Amendment is construed
to prevent the imposing of rates on a utility which are confiscatory in their
effect. Southern Iowa Elec. Co. v. City of Chariton (1921) 255 U. S. 539, 41
Sup. Ct. 4oo; Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Conley (1915) 236 U. S. 605, 35 Sup. Ct. 437;
Northern Pac. Ry. v. North Dakota (9,5) 236 U. S. 585, 35 Sup. Ct. 429; Isaacs,
Judicial Review of Administrative Findings (1921) 30 YAim LAw JOURNAL, 781;
Hardman, Judicial Review as a Requirement of Due Process it Rate Regulation
(1921) 30 ibid. 681; as to the power of the legislature, see C. B. & Q. Ry. v. Iowa
(1876) 94 U. S. 155.
2"A mine, a railway, a (parcel of real estate, a factory, each is valued on the
basis of its net income.... In the world of affairs .... all property is valued
in terms of its income; all that brings in an income is alike capital, and all is
measured or capitalized on the basis of its income." 2 Taussig, Principles of
Economics (2d ed. 192o) 118; Hale, The "Physical Value" Fallacy in Rate Cases
(1921) 30 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 710.
'Smyth v. Ames, infra note 5; 2 Wyman, Public Service Corporations (I9II)
secs. iog-iog8, and cases there cited.
"Edgerton, Value of the Service as a Factor it Rate Making (919) 32 HARV.
L. REV. 516. It is simply another way of saying that the rate must be fixed
between limits set by the cost of service, and what policy dictates its value to
be to the public. Mr. Justice Swayze's definition of a fair rate is: "On the one
hand a just and reasonable rate can never exceed, perhaps can rarely equal, the
value of the service to the consumer. On the other hand, it can never be made
by compulsion of public authority so low as to amount to confiscation. A just
and reasonable rate must ordinarily fall somewhere between these two extremes,
so as to allow both sides to profit by the conduct of the business and the improve-
ments of methods and increases of efficiency ... To induce the investment and
continuance of capital there must be some hope of gain commensurate with that
realizable in other business; the mere assurance that the investment will not be
confiscated will not suffice." Public Service Gas Co. v. Public Utility Commis-
sioners (0913) 84 N. J. L. 463, 471, 87 Atl. 651, 655, aff'd 87 N. J. L. 581, 95
At. io79.
" (1898) 169 U. S. 466, 18 Sup. Ct. 418. In Brymer v. Butler Water Co. (1897)
X79 Pa. 231, 250, 36 Atl. 249, 251, the following language is used: "Ordinarily,
that is a reasonable charge or system of charges which yields a fair return upon
the investment. Fixed charges and the cost of maintenance and operation must
first be provided for. Then the interests of the owners of the property are to be
considered. They are entitled to a rate of return, if their property will earn it,
no less than the legal rate of interest; and a system of charges that yields no
more income than is fairly required to maintain the plant, pay fixed charges and
operating expenses, provide a suitable sinking fund for the payment of debts, and
pay a fair return to the owners of the property, cannot be said to be unreasonable."
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theory, and this is the theory almost exclusively applied today.6 Mr.
Justice Harlan said that the fair value depended upon the original cost
of construction, the amount expended in permanent improvements, the
amount and market value of its bonds and stock, the present as com-
pared with the original cost of construction, the probable earning capa-
city of the property under particular rates prescribed by statute, and the
sum required to meet operating expenses. The Supreme Court sensed
the difficulties of this rule, and in the Minnesota Rate Cases
7 suggested
that "the ascertainment of that value is not controlled by artificial rules.
It is not a matter of formulas, but there must be a reasonable judgment
having its basis in a proper consideration of all relevant facts."
Attempts to apply this unwieldy rule have led to bizarre results because
of the inherent fallacy of its economic basis." Besides being difficult
of application because of the numerous elements to be considered,
9 it is
open to objection on the ground that it allows a company to profit
directly by its unearned increment.1 0
'Wyman, op. cit. supra note 3, sec. lO99 and cases cited; Lincoln Gas & Electric
Co. v. Lincoln. (1919) 25o U. S. 256, 39 Sup. Ct. 454; Denver v. Denver Water
Co. (1918) 246 U. S. 178, 38 Sup. Ct. 278; Des Moines Gas Co. v. Des Moines
(914) 238 U. S. 153, 35 Sup. Ct. 811 ; Landon v. Court of Industrial Relations
(i92o, Kan.) 269 Fed. 433; Consolidated Gas Co. v. Newton (192o; S. D. N. Y.)
267 Fed. 231; Houston Elec. Co. v. Houston (i92o, S. D. Texas) 265 Fed. 36o;
Municipal Gas Co. v. Public Service Con. (1920, Sup. Ct.) 113 Misc. 748, 186
N. Y. Supp. 541; Kings County Lighting Co. v. Lewis (i92o, Sup. Ct.) i1O Misc.
204, i8o N. Y. Supp. 570.
* (1913) 230 U. S. 352, 434, 33 Sup. Ct. 729, 754. One court has said that the
problem involved is a "question of sound business judgment rather than one of
legal formula and must often be tentative, since exact results cannot be foretold,"
it being "a question of fact to be settled by the good sense of the tribunal it may
come before." State Pub. Util. Comm. v. Springfield Gas & Elec. Co. (192o)
291 Ill. 209, 125 N. E. 891. One author considers it as experimenting in one
limited field with a question of policy. Hale, Rate Making and the Revision of
the Property Concept (1922) 22 CoL. L. REv. :209. And it has been said that
trained judgment is the final and controlling factor to be applied. This amounts
to an abandonment of the attempt to construct any rule.
'Supra note 2.
'Lincoln Gas & Elec. Co. v. Lincoln, supra note 6.
"' "It is insisted that in reproduction estimates the enhanced value of the prop-
erty between the time of the original location of a railroad through a wilderness
or marsh, it may be, is not to be taken into account 40 or 50 years afterwards,
when civilization, perhaps largely the result of the expenditures and operations
of the road, has increased original values a hundred-fold.... The law is perfectly
settled, with the obvious view of the matter, that increments and losses alike
attach to ownership as to duties and rights pertaining to property." Louisville
& N. Ry. Comm. (1912, N. D. Ala.) 196 Fed. Soo, 821. The public should not
be called upon to pay rates that will allow a return on something that has cost
the utility nothing; nor if the property depreciates in value should the road
bear the loss as it is restricted as to the rates it may charge. For a more com-
plete discussion of the weaknesses of this plan, and advantages of the "prudent
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In Galveston Electric Co. v. Galveston (1922, U. S.) 42 Sup. Ct. 351,
Mr. Justice Brandeis intimated that the "prudent investment" theory
of valuation, which is the fourth and last theory, and one that has been
proposed by many writers,' might serve as a better basis for fixing
rates. Part of the satisfaction from this intimation was lost, however,
when Mr. Justice Clarke disregarded this suggestion in a slightly later
case.' 2 As yet the courts, unlike the public service commissions, have
been unwilling to adopt this theory.' 3  According to this plan the
amount actually prudently invested in the plant determines its valua-
tion.14 It is submitted, however, that in figuring the amount under
this theory, allowance should be made for the depreciated purchasing
power of the dollar.' 5 When imprudent investments, watered stock,
and dishonesty are eliminated, a figure closely approximating the value
of the property devoted to the public use will be obtained, and this in
investment" theory, see Richberg, A Permanent Basis for Rate Regulation (1921)
31 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 262; Hale, The "Physical Value" Fallacy in Rate Cases
(1921) 30 ibid. 71o; Henderson, Railway Valuation and the Courts (1920) 33
HAav. L. Rxv. 9o2; ibid. 1031.
'Hale, op. cit. supra note 1O; Richberg, op. cit. supra note iO; Henderson,
op. cit. supra note io.
'2Houston v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. (1922, U. S.) 42 Sup. Ct. 486,
where the court said: The "proper basis for rate making is the fair value of the
property at the time of the inquiry," and not the actual cost of the original plant
(the prudent investment theory) as taken by the commission.
"- In spite of the fact that their findings may be taken to the courts for review
and disapproved, this theory has the support of the vast majority of public utility
commissions. Cavanaugh v. Whitefish Municipal Water Util. [1922 E] Pub. Util.
Rep. (Mont.) 198; Re Interstate Water Co. [i922 E] Pub. Util. Rep. (Ill.) 246;
Re Pacific Power & Light Co. [1922 E] Pub. Util. Rep. (Or.) 275; Re Tucson
Gas, Light & Power Co. [1922 C] Pub. Util. Rep. (Ariz.) 658; Re So.
Calif. Tel. Co. [922 C] Pub. Util. Rep. (Calif.) 97; Re Pacific Elec. Ry.
[i922 C] Pub. Util. Rep. (Calif.) 134; Re Pub. Service Gas Co. [I922 C1 Pub.
Util. Rep. (N. J.) 493; Re Molalla Elec. Co. [1922 C1 Pub. Util. Rep. (Or.) 8io;
see NOTE AND COMMENT (1921) 19 MIcro L. Rnv. 849.
"We can determine the worth of the service furnished by any utility on a
mathematical basis by adding to the operating cost the current rate of interest
on the capital which actually and prudently has been put into, and remains in,
the enterprise. If the books of a utility are properly kept, those books will show
the exact amount of money which has been invested. If the books are not
properly kept, competent engineers and accountants can determine with reasonable
accuracy the amount of prudent investment which must have been made in the
development of the properties, using the historical reproduction cost, not as the
basis for determining any elusive 'value' of the property, but for the simple
purpose of determining the capital cost of the services." Richberg, op. cit. supra
note 1o, at p. 273.
'This is not the same as allowing enhanced values and care must be taken to
keep the two distinct. The argument for allowing this is well stated in Consoli-
dated Gas Co. v. Newton, supra note 6, although the case is decided on the
fair-value rule.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
the last analysis, giving justice to the public and allowing a rate that will
induce investment now, is the true criterion.1 6
APPLICATION OF THE LAW OF NUISANCE TO UNREGISTERED AUTOMOBILES
By interpretation of a statute a series of decisions has firmly estab-
lished the principle in Massachusetts that an unregistered automobile is
a nuisance on the public highway and its driver is a trespasser.' This
leads to two results: In the absence of reckless, wanton, or wilful mis-
conduct the operator of the outlawed machine can not recover for any
injuries to himself or to his property;' and secondly, he is liable for all
damages to others directly resulting from such unlawful operation
irrespective of negligence on his part.3 In Maine a similar statute has
been construed in like manner.4 Connecticut has reached an analogous
result by a statute which expressly provides that there shall be no
recovery of damages by the owner or the operator of, or by any
passenger in, an automobile that is not duly registered.'
However, the great majority of courts in passing on the effect of non-
registration of automobiles have attained a different result on the theory
"This theory, too, is open to objections, one of which is that investors may
have purchased the stock either above or below par and consequently their return
may not always be equitable. The fair-value rule is open to objection on the same
ground, and in addition it encourages further haphazard investment. On the
whole, the "prudent investment theory" seems sounder. It is also worthy of note
that when the Interstate Commerce Commission completes its valuation of all
the property used by common carriers as ordered by sec. i9a of the Interstate
Commerce Act, Act of Feb. 28, i92o (41 Stat. at L. 456), the vast amount of data
may be employed in determining rates under the "prudent investment theory,"
since the Act provides in sec. I5a that "the Commission may utilize the results of
its investigation .... and shall give due consideration to all the elements of
value recognized by the law of the land for rate-making purposes." See Artaud,
A Review of the Federal Valuation of Railroads (1922) 32 YALE LAW JOURNAL,
37, 46.
'Beginning with Dudley v. Northampton St. Ry. (19o9) 202 Mass. 443, 89 N. E.
25, interpreting Mass. Sts. 1903, ch. 473, sec. i, as amended by Sts. i9o5, ch. 311,
sec. 2; and culminating in Gondek v. Cudahy Packing Co. (1919) 233 Mass. 1o5,
123 N. E. 398, and Pierce v. Hutchinson (1922, Mass.) 136 N. E. 261; (923) 71
U. PA. D. REv. 166.
'Holden v. McGillicuddy (1913) 215 Mass. 563, 102 N. E. 923; Dean v. Boston
Elevated Ry. (I914) -217 Mass. 495, 1O5 N. E. 616.
'Fairbanks v. Kemp (1917) 226 Mass. 75, i15 N. E. 24o; Koonovsky v. Quel-
lette (917) 226 Mass. 474, i16 N. E. 243. Moreover, the owner of an unreg-
istered automobile who permits another to operate it is liable for the damages
resulting from such operation. Gould v. Elder (1914) 219 Mass. 396, Io7 N. E.
59; Evans v. Rice (i92i) 238 Mass. 318, 13o N. E. 672.
'Me. Pub. Laws, 1911, ch. 162, sec. ii, construed in McCarthy v. Inhabitants of
Town of Leeds (1916) 115 Me. I34, 98 Atl. 72.
'Conn. Gen. Sts. 1918, ch. 77, sec. 1565; Brown v. New Haven Taxicab Co.
(1917) 92 Conn. 252, 1o2 Atl. 573. Connecticut does not go so far as to hold
such a driver liable for damage to others, irrespective of his own negligence.
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that the failure to obey the law in regard to registration is not a proxi-
mate cause of the injury, and that the plaintiff cannot be denied recovery
or the defendant's liability established solely on that ground.6 This
view harmonizes with the other decisions on the question of civil liability
for injuries connected with the breach of a statutory duty.7  To impose
liability on one who violates a statute, two elements must exist-the
legislature must have intended to protect the particular class to which
the plaintiff belongs from the type of harm that he suffered, and the
breach of statute must have been the proximate cause of the injury.8
Since registration statutes are not entirely revenue statutes, but are
an exercise of the police power for the purpose of controlling and regu-
lating automobiles on the highway,9 there is some basis for the view
of the Massachusetts courts that the statute was intended to safeguard
from risk of injury persons lawfully using the highway.10 But since
it is difficult, if not impossible, to refute the contention that an accident
would have happened even though every automobile involved had been
registered, it seems that in these cases rights are being extinguished
and duties created without much reference to the ordinary principles of
legal causation. 1'
In McDonald v. Dundon (1922, Mass.) 136 N. E. 264, an automobile
dealer ioaned a set of license plates for use on another person's car.
*It does not preclude recovery. Stovall v. Corey-Highlands Land Co. (1914)
I89 Ala. 576, 66 So. 577; Southern Ry. v. Vaughan's Admr. (1916) 118 Va. 692,
88 S. E. 3o5; Wilford v. City of Grinnell (1917) 179 Iowa, 689, 161 N. W. 686.
It does not establish liability. Lindsay v. Cecchi (19i1, Del.) 3 Boyce, 133, 8o
Atl. 523; Hyde v. McCreery (1911) 145 App. Div. 729, 13o N. Y. Supp. 269;
Black v. Moree (1916) 135 Tenn. 73, 185 S. W. 682.
'Flaherty v. Metro Stations (1922, Sup. Ct.) 196 N. Y. Supp. 2 (violation of
statute prescribing the kind of structures to be used for storage of oil products
held not to be the proximate cause of burns received by a boy who took gasoline
from a can catching drippings and carried it to a bonfire some distance away);
Texas & P. Ry. v. Marrujo (i915, Texas Civ. App.) 172 S. W. 588 (failure to
ring bell when approaching crossing as required by statute not the proximate
cause of the death of one who with unobstructed view crosses track in front
of approaching train); Paietta v. Illinois Zinc Co. (1912) 257 Ill. II, Ioo N. E.
218 (failure to mark danger on loose rock as required by statute is not the proxi-
mate cause of death of a miner who is removing it) ; Steel Car Forge Co. v. Chec
(1911) lO7 C. C. A. 192, 184 Fed. 868 (violation of child labor statute not the
proximate cause of an injury received in the course of employment). As to
violation of statutes regarding automobiles, see Armstead v. Lounsberry (1915)
129 Minn. 34, 151 N. W. 542; Derr v. Chicago M. & St. P. Ry. (1916) 163 Wis.
234, 157 N. W. 753.
'Schaar v. Conforth (1915) 128 Minn. 46o, I5I N. W. 275; Di Caprio v. IV. Y.
Cent. Ry. (1921) 231 N. Y. 94, 131 N. E. 746; COMMENTS (1922) 1o CAurF. L. REV.
255; Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action (1914) 27 H.Av. L. REV. 317.
'See Greig v. City of Merritt (1913, Br. Col.) ii Dom. Law Rep. 852, 854;
Huddy, Automobiles (1922, 6th ed.) IO4.
"See Dudley v. Northampton St. Ry., supra note I.
SSupra note 8.
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The operator was held liable for damages resulting to the plaintiff
from an accident, on the ground that the unregistered automobile was
a nuisance. Liability was also imposed upon the dealer due to the
fact that by the lending of the license plates he had made possible the
commission of the nuisance. This decision is an extreme development
of vicarious liability. But in view of the fact that it is well established
that all persons who contribute to or participate in the commission of
a nuisance are liable for all injuries proximately resulting therefrom,12
however much we may disagree with the soundness of the Massachusetts
rule, this case may be justified as a logical extension of the general
doctrine.
A word is "the skin of a living thought."' Thoughts are more
numerous than words. Hence, at times, different thoughts wear the
same skin. From this results the necessity of ascertaining whether a
given word may properly cover more than one thought, and if it does,
of ascertaining which thought it covers when it is used in a particular
sentence and the advisability of restrictions either by'convention, for
example, the use of Hohfeld's terminology, or by qualifying words or
phrases which shall bring it about that a word or phrase always covers
the same thought.
Whitehill v. Halbing (1922) 98 Conn. 21, 118 At. 454,2 interprets
a Connecticut statute which reads as follows:
"Sec. 4946. Revocation of a will. If, after the making of a will,
the testator shall marry, or if a child is born to the testator, and no pro-
vision is made in the will for such contingency, such marriage or birth
shall operate as a revocation of such will. No will or codicil shall be
revoked in any other manner except by burning, cancelling, tearing or
obliterating it by the testator or by some person in his presence by his
direction or by a later will or codicil." 3
The statute itself demonstrates that the word "will" the first five times
it is used means an instrument executed with the statutory formalities,
which has not yet been made effective by the death of the testator.
If becoming effective because of the death of the testator were necessary
to make a document a "will," a will would never be revoked either by
marriage or by burning, etc., or by a later will. The word is used
with the same signification in the General Statutes of Connecticut, 1918,
sec. 4947.
-' Cohen v. Mayor of New York (1889) 113 N. Y. 532, 21 N. E. 700; Board of
Chosen Freeholders of Hudson Co. v. Woodcliff Land Improvement Co. (1907)
74 N. J. L. 355, 65 Atl. 844; Wood, Nuisances (1875, 3d ed.) sec. 31.
'Towne v. Eisner (1917) 245 U. S. 418, 425, 38 Sup. Ct. i58, 159.
'See COMMENTS (922) 32 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 70.
' Italics are the author's.
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The statement that a will is always ambulatory is meaningless unless
the word "will" means merely a document duly executed. In the
majority opinion in the instant case, the word is repeatedly used as
a skin for the same thought. This accords with popular usage.
Living men refer to their "wills." On the other hand the majority
opinion quotes authorities which demonstrate that at times the word
means a document made effective by death. The real question before
the court, therefore, was which of the two thoughts was covered by the
skin "will" when it was used for the sixth and last time in the section
quoted.
In view of the foregoing it is manifest that the question cannot be
answered by an appeal to definitions of the word which make effective-
ness by reason of the death of the testator an essential element before
a document can be called a will. Such definitions show merely that
this is a meaning of the word-not that it is the only meaning.
The question, therefore, is whether the state of the law at the time of
the enactment of the statute, or public policy, or both, overcome the
strong natural inference that when the legislature had used a word
five times in a statute, always with the same meaning, it there abandons
this meaning, and when using it for the sixth and last time refers to
something else. The joining with it of the adjective "later," if any-
thing, would seem to strengthen the inference that it did not intend
to abandon it.
The state of the law and the considerations of public policy are so fully
stated in the opinions and in the earlier comment4 that further discus-
sion seems unnecessary. The purpose of this comment is merely to
call attention to the case as an interesting example of the use of the
same word to indicate two different meanings, and of the importance
of having this fact in mind when considering statutes in which it appears.
One matter of policy may, however, be suggested. The execution
of a second will with a revoking clause demonstrates the abandonment
of the intention expressed by the first will. If the testator again adopts
the original intention, such adoption may, under the decision in the
instant case, be made effective by a destruction of the second will. As
Chief Justice Wheeler points out, such destruction is essentially a testa-
mentary act. It should be effective only if the testator acts freely
and has testamentary capacity. It would seem to accord with our
policy to safeguard every testamentary act by requiring witnesses who
can fix the time and attest the capacity of the testator and the regularity
of this act. Otherwise it would be difficult, if not impossible, to prove
incapacity or undue influence.
The possible harm resulting from the impossibility' of fixing the time
when the revocation took place and the resulting difficulty in ascertain-
ing whether or not the testator then had capacity and acted freely is
' Supra note 2.
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much greater under the rule in the instant case than it would be if the
result of revocation was intestacy, because the law views intestacy as
normal and requiring no safeguards, whereas experience has shown
the necessity of safeguards around testamentary acts.
HARRISON HEWITT
New Haven, Connecticut
"Such words as 'right' are a constant solicitation to fallacy." Thus
speaks Mr. Justice Holmes in a recent opinion involving an interesting
point in the law of Pennsylvania relating to party walls. Jackman v.
Rosenbaum Co. (1922, U. S.) 43 Sup. Ct. 9. The plaintiff owned in
Pittsburgh a theatre building one wall of which ran along, but not over,
the dividing line between his property and the adjacent lot of the defend-
ant. The latter, in erecting a department store building, began the
erection of a party wall, intending to incorporate therein the old wall
of the plaintiff's theatre. But the city authorities decided that the old
wall was not safe for this purpose and ordered its removal.. This was
done by the contractor in charge of erecting the defendant's building.
For damages thus caused, the plaintiff sued, alleging loss of rental
for a theatrical season and expenses in restoring the theatre to its
former condition. The defendant justified the destruction of the old
wall and the erection of the party wall by virtue of a statute,1 and denied
responsibility for any damage necessarily incident to the exercise of
this statutory privilege. To this contention the plaintiff replied that
if the statute were interpreted to exclude recovery of damages with-
out proof of negligence, it was contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment.
The court refused so to hold. A verdict for the plaintiff was set aside
and a judgment for the defendant non obstante veredicto was affirmed
by the state Supreme Court.
2
The fallacy of the plaintiff's argument consists in the assumption
that he has a "right" that the adjacent property owner shall not use
a portion of the plaintiff's land for a party wall without compensating
him for damages thereby caused. Mr. Justice Holmes goes on to
expound the fallacy with his usual clarity of thought and of expression:
"We say a man has a right to the land that he has bought, and that
to subject a strip six inches or a foot wide to liability to use for a party
'This statute is the Act of June 7, 1895 (Pa. Sts. 1920, sec. 4046 et seq.).
The opinion refers to the fact that the custom of party walls was introduced
by the first settlers in Philadelphia under William Penn and has prevailed ever
since, as is illustrated by statutes going back to 1721. Mr. Justice Holmes says:
"The Fourteenth Amendment, itself a historical product, did not destroy
history for the States and substitute mechanical compartments of law all exactly
alike. If a thing has been practiced for two hundred years by common consent,
it will need a strong case for the Fourteenth Amendment to affect it,.
' (1919) 263 Pa. 158, xo6 Atl. 238.
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wall therefore takes his right to that extent. It might be so, and we
might be driven to the economic and social considerations that we have
mentioned, if the law were an innovation, now heard of for the first
time. But if, from what we may call time immemorial, it has been the
understanding that the burden exists, the landowner does not have the
right to that part of his land except as so qualified, and the statute that
embodies that understanding does not need to invoke the police power."
The value of having an invariable meaning for the word "right" has
been often emphasized.3  Accurate terminology does not solve legal
problems but it turns the spot-light on them so that lawyer and judge
may see more clearly the principles, historic, political, or economic,
which control the decision. To argue that the plaintiff had a "right"
to his six-inch strip of land and therefore that the defendant must
make compensation for damages caused by its use for a party wall is
to beg the question: the very issue in dispute is whether the legal rela-
tion between the parties with respect to damages caused by using that
strip for party wall purposes is one of right-duty, or of no-right-
privilege. When the issue is thus disclosed, Pennsylvania history
settles it. In some other state, where the history of party wall customs
has been different, the right-duty relation might prevail,4 or, if a
statutory privilege had been granted the adjacent owner, such privilege
might have to be sustained under the rubric of police power.5
The problem of legal causation has its interest even for the tax-
gatherer and the brewer. The income tax law of New Zealand permits
the taxpayers to deduct expenditures "exclusively incurred in the pro-
duction of the assessable income." A brewer expended 2,1231. 3s.iid.
for the purpose of defeating the enactment of a prohibitory law at one
of the triennial polls which are provided for by the law of New Zealand.
In Ward & Co. v. Commissioner of Taxes (1922, P. C.) 39 T. L. R. 9o,
the unfeeling Judicial Committee of the Privy Council refused to allow
the brewer to deduct his expenditure for the above .purpose from the
taxable income of his business. It was contended that "it was inequit-
able that the Legislature should, on the one hand, force a certain class
of traders into a struggle for their very existence, and, on the other hand,
treat the reasonable expenses incurred in connection with such struggle
as part of the profits assessable to income tax." The court, however,
was not dealing with equities but with legal causation, and it held that
the expenditure in question "was incurred not for the production of
income, but for the purpose of preventing the extinction of the business
from which the income was derived, which is quite a different thing."
' See COMMENTS (1922) 32 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 157, note 2.
'See Brooks v. Curtis (1873) 50 N. Y. 644; Fowler v. Saks (1890) iS D. C.
570; 7 L. R. A. 649, note; Fowler v. Koehler (915, D. C.) 43 App. Cas. 349;
Ann. Cas. 1916 E 1165, note.
'See 20 R. C. L. 1o87; Walker v. Gish (January 2, 1923) U. S. Sup. Ct., Oct.
Term, 1922, No. 135.
